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ESSAY
THE LEGACY OF JUSTICE BRENNAN:
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE LEFT-
LIBERAL POLITICAL AGENDA
LINO A. GRAGLIA *
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. served on the United States Supreme Court
for more than a third of a century, from 1956 to 1990, long after President
Eisenhower, who foolishly appointed him to gain a temporary political
advantage,1 was gone from office and had passed away. Justice Brennan,
previously an obscure state court judge in New Jersey,2 mad  a lot of his lucky
appointment, so much so that he made himself arguably the most important
figure in American public life in the second half of the twentieth century, even
though most of his fellow citizens would not have recognized his name. His
importance derived, however, from his exercise of a power he had not been
granted.
The pillars of the scheme of government created by the Constitution are
republicanism, that is, representative self-government, and federalism, that is, a
national government of limited power with most decisions of social policy made
at the state level. These principles are the source of our unprecedented freedom,
prosperity, and success as a Nation. Policymaking by the Supreme Court—by
majority vote of a committee of nine lawyers, unelected and holding office for
life, making policy for the Nation as a whole from Washington, D.C.—wholly
undemocratic and wholly centralized, is the antithesis of these principles. Yet,
the astounding fact is that virtually every major change in domestic social policy
in the last four decades has been made not by decisions of elected legislators,
state or federal, but by decisions of the Justices of the Supreme Court.3 The one
* A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas, Austin, Texas. I thank David DeGroot
for excellent research assistance.
1. See PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST 24-25 (1994) (describing how President
Eisenhower’s desire to influence Catholic vote in northeast was factor in his decision to appoint Brennan
to Supreme Court).
2. See id. at 23. Justice Brennan served as the chief justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
before Eisenhower appointed him to the U.S. Supreme Court. See id.
3. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1991)
(noting with approval the impact of Supreme Court’s decisions on school prayer, abortion, desegregation,
and apportionment over last 40 years). But see DAVID LOWENTHAL, NO LIBERTY FOR LICENSE: THE
FORGOTTEN LOGIC OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT xiv (1997) (noting with disapprobation these same
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person most influential in this perversion of our constitutional system of
government was William J. Brennan, Jr.4
The changes brought about by the Supreme Court during Justice Brennan’s
tenure were truly revolutionary, remaking not only our form of government, but
also the nature of our society and the quality of our civilization. The Court
decided issues literally of life and death, such as abortion5 and capital
punishment6; issues of public morality, such as pornography control7 and
homosexual rights8; and issues of public order, such as limitations on street
demonstrations9 and vagrancy control.10 The Court has taken religion out of
public life by disallowing state-sponsored prayer in the public schools11 while
also prohibiting most forms of government aid, state or federal, to religious
schools12 and most displays of religious symbols in public places.13 Overturning
centuries of tradition and the practice of almost all civilized societies, the Court
has disallowed almost all distinctions on the basis of sex,14 alienag15 (removing
the disadvantage of refusing to declare allegiance to the country), and
illegitimacy16 (greatly reducing the stigma of out-of-wedlock births). During the
decisions and their effects).
4. See IRONS, supra note 1, at 326 (Harvard law professor Frank Michelman identifies Brennan as
“the foremost judicial architect of American constitutionalism since John Marshall.”).
5. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional the majority of states’ laws
restricting abortion); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming validity of
Roe v. Wade).
6. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding imposition of death penalty constituted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
7. See A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966) (holding that patently offensive book which appeals to prurient interests is entitled to
protection of First and Fourteenth Amendments).
8. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that Constitution does not confer
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy).
9. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (holding that statute prohibiting picketing near
courthouse with intent to obstruct justice does not infringe on rights of free speech and assembly).
10. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding local vagrancy ordinance
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds).
11. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding nonsectarian prayer prepared by New York
Board of Regents and recited daily by each class in local school inconsistent with Establishment Clause).
12. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that state may not pay to send public
school teachers into parochial schools to teach secular remedial courses), overruled by Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that state may not pay teachers
to conduct secular remedial classes in parochial school).
13. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding unconstitutional Kentucky law
requiring posting of Ten Commandments in public school classrooms).
14. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that higher drinking age for males than
females violates Equal Protection Clause).
15. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that requiring recipients of state
educational aid to renounce foreign citizenship violates Equal Protection Clause).
16. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that denial to illegitimate children of right
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Cold War, the Court disallowed the exclusion of Communist Party members
from public school teaching positions17 and even from defense plants.18
The Court has devised and imposed on the states and the Federal
Government a system of criminal procedure known to no other society.
Apparently adopting the view, fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s, that society,
not the criminal, is at fault, it vastly expanded the rights of the criminally
accused.19 The result is a system of criminal justice—in which the guilt of the
accused is often the least relevant consideration—so costly and complex as to
make the prosecution of crime often seem not worthwhile. The Court expanded
the jurisdiction of federal courts to permit detailed intervention and continuing
supervision of the Nation’s schools,20 pri ons,21 hospitals,22 and mental
institutions.23 The Court undertook the revision of welfare systems, providing
benefits (and adding costs) beyond those provided by legislatures.24
In perhaps the most impressive demonstration of its irresistible power, the
Court ordered that school children be excluded from their neighborhood schools
because of their race and transported to more distant schools in an attempt to
increase school racial integration or “balance.”25 By driving the mostly white,
middle class from our urban public school systems, this massive social
to recover for wrongful death of their mother violates Equal Protection Clause).
17. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that state may not remove
teachers for advocating overthrow of U.S. Government).
18. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (holding that section of Subversive Activities
Control Act making it unlawful for member of Communist-action organization to engage in any
employment in any defense facility violates First Amendment right of association).
19. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that admission of statements obtained in
police station interrogation without full warning of constitutional rights violates Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained
by search in violation of Fourth Amendment is inadmissible).
20. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that
“desegration” requires busing of students to increase racial mixing); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that school may not prohibit students from wearing
black armbands in classroom as political protest due to First and Fourteenth Amendments); Dunn v. Tyler
Indep. Sch. Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding constitutional the automatic suspension of
students participating in walkout).
21. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that certain operations of Texas
Department of Corrections—for instance, not providing at least 60 square feet per prisoner—were
unconstitutional).
22. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (addressing rights of indigents to
treatment at hospitals classified as charitable organizations).
23. See Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988) (ruling on permissibility of release of
mental patient).
24. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (discussing constitutional limitations on
termination of welfare benefits).
25. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 23.
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experiment has made the schools less, not more, integrated, deprived of
community support, and overwhelmingly nonwhite.26 In Kansas City alone,
orders of a single federal district judge, following policies decreed by Justice
Brennan, have required expenditures approaching two billion dollars.27 Neither
integration nor learning increased, but the orders continued to be handed down
and obeyed. This raises a real question of the limit, if any, on the power of
federal judges. When, if ever, would such orders not be obeyed—when the costs
reach ten billion dollars? A hundred billion? Is there any point at which present-
day Americans or their elected representatives will rebel against this judicial
usurpation of legislative power?
This catalogue of revolutionary Supreme Court decisions on fundamental
issues of social policy, which could easily be extended, were all made under the
leadership, or at least with the encouragement and concurrence, of Justice
Brennan. The only ground on which he ever objected to the Court’s assumption
of policymaking power on an issue—for example, capital punishment,28 sex
discrimination,29 and aid to religious schools30—was that the Court did not go
far enough.
Two things must be understood about these decisions, all highlights of
Justice Brennan’s career, to understand fully the magnitude of his achievement.
The first is that they have virtually nothing to do with the Constitution and
sometimes (for example, Justice Brennan’s insistence that capital punishment is
unconstitutional, despite being explicitly recognized by the Constitution)31 are in
direct defiance of the Constitution. The irrelevance of the Constitution to these
26. See generally LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON
RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976).
27. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987); rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 495
U.S. 33 (1990) (holding that federal courts could require school district to levy taxes in excess of limits set
by state statute in order to fund school desegregation plan).
28. See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 641 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Adhering to my
view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, I would . . . vacate the death sentence in this case.” (citation omitted));
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur civilization and the law
[have] progressed to [the point at which punishment by death is morally impermissible] and that therefore
the punishment of death, for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is ‘cruel and unusual’ in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.”).
29. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding
that sex is “suspect” criterion requiring “strict scrutiny").
30. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (state statute authorizing funds for private sectarian schools “in its entirety offends the
First Amendment’s prohibition against laws ‘respecting an establishment of religion’”); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 373-85 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
31. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/4
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decisions should be clear enough from the fact that the great majority of them
involved state, rather than federal, law, and nearly all of those purported to be
based on a single constitutional provision, one sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and indeed, on four words: “due process” and “equal protection.”
It requires no jurisprudential sophistication to understand that the Court does
not decide myriad difficult issues of social policy by studying those four words.
The claim that the Court reaches its remarkable decisions by “interpreting” the
Constitution is entirely false; nothing is, in fact, being interpreted. For example,
what do you suppose Justice Harry Blackmun interpreted in Roe v. Wade,32
“due” or “process”? In each case, the Court simply substituted the policy
preferences of a majority of the Justices for the preferences of elected
legislators, and the only question presented by the decisions is why it is the
preferences of the Justices that should prevail.
No one was more opposed than Justice Brennan to the Constitution meaning
what it was intended to mean or to its having any definite meaning. His agenda
required that it be made, as Thomas Jefferson feared, a “mere thing of wax in
the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they
please.”33 The intent of the Constitution’s framers and ratifiers, Brennan
insisted, was unknowable and, in any event, irrelevant, the product of a world
that is “dead and gone.”34 To him this meant, however, not that the Constitution
had no discernable meaning, but that it had any meaning he chose to give it. It
was, he said, “the lodestar for our aspirations,”35  my terious thing both
“luminous and obscure.”36 This deprived it, of course, of an essential quality of
law—knowability—and made it a private crystal ball in which he could
discover things others could not see. That this made him the Nation’s ultimate
lawgiver on any issue of his choosing, if he could persuade four of his fellow
liberal activists to go along,37 disturbed him not at all. Indeed, he clearly saw it
32. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 212, 213 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
34. William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium, Georgetown University
(October 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11, 17
(Federalist Soc’y ed., 1986); see also Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared,
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1986, at 19.
35. Brennan, supra note 34, at 11.
36. Id.
37. “[W]hoever hath an absolute Authority to interpret any written, or spoken Laws; it is He, who is
truly the Law-giver, to all Intents and Purposes; and not the Person who first wrote, or spoke them.”
Benjamin Hoadly, The Nature of the Kingdom, or Church, of Christ, Sermon Preached Before the King
(Mar. 31, 1717), in 2 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN HOADLY 402, 404 (John Hoadly ed., 1773).
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as an improvement on the science of government.
Justice Brennan’s disdain for a Constitution of definite meaning was
matched, as was to be expected, by his contempt for popular self-government.
By the end of his career, he had grown sufficiently arrogant and confident of his
power to make this explicit. With a candor unique in our judicial history, he
openly rejected “faith in the majoritarian process” because it “counsels
restraint” on the part of judges.38 Respect for representative self-government, he
pointed out, could lead the Court to “stay its hand” when “invalidation of a
legislature’s substantive policy choice” is involved.39 He simply could see no
reason why anyone would prefer the judgment of elected legislators to his own.
“Faith in democracy is one thing,” he warned, but “blind faith quite
another.”40 Although Brennan conceded that resolution of policy issues “through
the majoritarian process has appeal,” he insisted that “it ultimately will not do,”
because elected representatives might do foolish or even terrible things.41 We
were fortunate, therefore, he was convinced, to have someone as wise and good
as himself as the ultimate policymaker, and his confidence in his power and
ability to fill the role was unbounded. A clearer illustration of the truth of Lord
Acton’s dictum that power corrupts would be difficult to find. It corrupts not by
making men venal, but worse, as in Justice Brennan’s case, by making them
arrogant, by giving them an exaggerated view of their wisdom and competence.
The second and final thing to note about the Court’s controversial
“constitutional” decisions during Justice Brennan’s tenure—in addition to the
irrelevance of the Constitution—is that they have not been random in their
political impact. On the contrary, they have in nearly every case disallowed a
policy choice made in the ordinary political process in order to substitute a
choice further to the left on the political spectrum, the policy preference of, for
example, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).42 Isn’t that an
amazing coincidence? Who would have suspected, without Justice Brennan’s
guidance, that the Constitution is a codification of the far left’s political agenda?
How are we to explain this extraordinary uniformity of result? The answer,
38. Brennan, supra note 34, at 15.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice and Religious
Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 63 (1996) [hereinafter Graglia, Of Animal Sacrifice]; Lino A. Graglia, A
Conservative Court? No, 1993 PUB. INT. L. REV. 147. For a representative case, see Board of Education
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), in which the ACLU helped parents and students bring suit against the
school district for removing allegedly inappropriate books from the school library.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss1/4
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very briefly, is that government by the Supreme Court in present-day America is
government by and for an educational and cultural elite. Academics, particularly
at our leading law schools, are—along with other members of the “knowledge
class”—overwhelmingly to the left of the majority of the American people. The
Justices are almost always graduates of these schools and members of this class.
Free from electoral accountability, they are much more subject than other public
officials to the influence of academics. The legitimacy their policymaking lacks
in democratic theory they must seek, instead, in academic approval.
No one was more attuned to liberal academic opinion than Justice Brennan,
and the function of the Court as he saw it was to make that opinion, rather than
conflicting popular opinion, the basis of social policy. Under his influence, the
Court became the mirror and mouthpiece of liberal academia, essentially the
enacting arm of the ACLU. The nightmare of the American academic
intellectual is that public policymaking should fall into the hands of the
American people. The American people, after all, actually favor such policies as
capital punishment, suppression of pornography, prayer in the schools, effective
criminal law, and neighborhood schools. It is only the Supreme Court that can
keep their views from prevailing. Academics, and specifically professors of
constitutional law, see it as their function, in turn, to defend Supreme Court
policymaking by arguing that the Justices are uniquely trustworthy, nonpartisan
public servants and that their revolutionary decisions are unavoidable mandates
of the Constitution.43
Lord Acton’s dictum applies more, however, not less, to Supreme Court
Justices than to other public officials. The Justices are, it seems sometimes to be
forgotten, all lawyers. Isn’t it odd that lawyers, rightly derided as persons whose
primary professional skill is manipulation of language in the interest of evading
truth, should be revered as moral leaders and social policy experts upon donning
a black robe? More important, among our public officials, the Supreme Court
Justices are the least accountable for their actions because they are the only
public officials not subject to judicial oversight. “We are not final because we
are infallible,” Justice Jackson once pointed out, “but we are infallible only
because we are final.”44 Supreme Court Justices are therefore the officials least
to be trusted with policymaking power.
Lord Acton’s dictum certainly applied to Justice Brennan, who was
43. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1308 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that
judges have responsibility to develop and defend theory of what rights are “preferred” or “fundamental” in
constitutional adjudication); see also Graglia, Of Animal Sacrifice, supra note 42, at 22 n.158.
44. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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thoroughly unscrupulous as to truth, fact, and logic when they stood in the way
of his desired result in any case. This can be clearly seen, for example, in his
decisions and behavior in regard to issues of race. Although Brown v. Board of
Education45 is seen as the climactic and pivotal constitutional decision of this
century, it happens that a much less well-known decision, Green v. County
School Board,46 decided in 1968 with an opinion for the Court by Justice
Brennan, is even more important in terms of contemporary race issues. It is
Green, not Brown, that is the source of all the legal disputes as to race that we
are dealing with today, the genesis of “affirmative action.”
Brown prohibited school racial segregation and, it soon became clear, all
racial discrimination by government. Brown became a reality with the 1964
Civil Rights Act,47 in which Congress ratified and extended the Brown
nondiscrimination principle. In Green, however, the Court, under the leadership
of Brennan, converted Brown’s prohibition of all official racial discrimination
into something like its opposite, a requirement of racial discrimination in order
to increase integration. The 1964 Civil Rights Act made Brown a success;
legally compelled racial segregation quickly came to an end, but perfect racial
equality did not result. Hubris resulting from the success and acclaim of Brown
made it possible for the Justices to think it was time for another “civil rights”
advance, to move from prohibiting segregation to the vastly more ambitious and
questionable project of attempting to compel integration.48
The Court could not, however, openly announce that the principle of the
great Brown decision had suddenly been overturned or drastically qualified, that
the Constitution not only did not prohibit, but actually required racial
discrimination when necessary to achieve greater school racial integration. As
always, Brennan did not let this difficulty stand in his way. He simply decided to
have it both ways, to impose a requirement of racial discrimination in the name
of prohibiting it, logic not being a requisite for an institution subject to no
review. In Green, Brennan repeatedly insisted that the constitutional
requirement continued to be the requirement of Brown, the elimination of all
racial discrimination.49 He nonetheless found, reversing the lower courts, that
the defendant school system was not in compliance with Brown despite the fact,
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000c (1994).
48. See generally GRAGLIA, supra note 26.
49. 391 U.S. at 435-38 (requirement continues to be only “racially nondiscriminatory school
system” mandated by Brown, a school system “in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch”).
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which he did not question, that all racial discrimination had been eliminated.50 In
response to the school board’s argument that the Constitution could not be read
to compel integration, Brennan simply denied that the Court was imposing such
a requirement51 but imposed it nonetheless by holding that the school system
was still unconstitutional—not “unitary”—because not sufficiently integrated.52
A few years later, Chief Justice Burger, newly appointed by President
Nixon, argued that the Court should resolve this contradiction, that it really
should make clear to the Nation’s school boards what the constitutional
requirement actually was.53 Ju tice Brennan, however, was strongly opposed
and successfully prevented this from happening. “[A]ny ‘realistic’ definition” of
a “unitary” system, he argued in a Court memorandum that has become public,
“would appear to be a retreat from Brown and any other type of definition
would, given the views of most whites, simply be impractical.”54 Th t s, to
openly state that the requirement was racial discrimination to increase
integration—a requirement that would apply to the schools of the North and
West as well as the South—would make it impossible for the Court to purport
to be merely enforcing Brown, but compulsory integration could not be imposed
except under the pretext of enforcing Brown. It was honesty that was
“impractical” and that Brennan successfully opposed.55
What public officials cannot do honestly, however, they almost certainly
should not do at all. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that a policy
founded on fraud, imposing a requirement of racial discrimination in the name
of enforcing a prohibition of racial discrimination, has proved to be a disaster.
The effect of court-ordered busing for school racial balance has been to expedite
the exodus of the middle class from our public school systems and cities, leaving
them less integrated and in rapid decline. But then, much of what Justice
50. See id. at 432. To set up a test case, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund stipulated
that the school system was being operated free of racial discrimination. See Lino A. Graglia, When
Honesty is “Simply . . . Impractical” for the Supreme Court: How the Constitution Came to Require
Busing for School Racial Balance, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1987). The district court and the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, therefore, held that the school system was in full compliance with Brown
and dismissed the case. See Bowman v. County Sch. Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated sub
nom. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
51. See Green, 391 U.S. at 437 (stating that school board was mistaken in arguing that Court was
“universally requiring ‘compulsory integration’”).
52. See id. at 437-38. For a fuller exposition of Justice Brennan’s reasoning in Green, see Graglia,
supra note 50, at 1158-62.
53. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
54. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN’S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT
90 (1986).
55. See Graglia, supra note 50.
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Brennan has wrongfully done—most clearly in the area of criminal procedure—
though wildly applauded by academia, has proved or will likely prove to be a
disaster. Whatever its other results, Justice Brennan’s career should serve to
prove that centralized government by unelected and unremovable Supreme
Court Justices is not an improvement on representative self-government in a
federalist system. This is so despite, or perhaps even because of, the fact that it
reliably enacts academia’s liberal policy preferences.
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